A lot of orgs “secured” GitHub Actions by pinning to tags, which is a fun strategy if you enjoy finding out your trusted scanner now has initial access. CI trust is getting weird in ways most runbooks still don’t cover.

“Fraud” makes it sound random. It isn’t. It’s identity infrastructure with a cash-out layer. Same proofing gaps, same rails, same reusable parts. People keep chasing claims instead of the production line.

Everyone’s hunting “AI attacks.” Meanwhile the ugly money is still in trusted pages, stolen sessions, and users politely pasting the command for them.

Iran cyber risk is not about whether they’ll be active. They will. The real question is whether the next 8 weeks produce a publicly attributed, materially disruptive hit with a new twist beyond the usual password-spray sludge. Tenant sabotage is the part to watch. 👀🔥

Blockchain C2” is usually just malware checking its public mailbox.

Iran cyber risk isn’t just “watch for wipers.” It’s the same ugly identity-first playbook: password sprays, MFA abuse, cloud access… then maybe admin-plane sabotage. Recent reporting says activity is already reaching U.S. targets. Cute. 🚨🔐🧨