A malicious package can be removed. A credential harvested from the build path can keep creating risk long after the incident looks closed. That is why “cleanup” and “containment” are not the same word, even if a dashboard would very much like them to be.

AI coding tools are becoming trusted middlemen. That gives defenders a new attack path to understand before it gets ugly.

The plugin had keys. A VS Code extension sat beside repos, tokens, terminals, and AI configs. That is not just productivity. That is inherited access.

A lot of orgs “secured” GitHub Actions by pinning to tags, which is a fun strategy if you enjoy finding out your trusted scanner now has initial access. CI trust is getting weird in ways most runbooks still don’t cover.

Blockchain C2” is usually just malware checking its public mailbox.

OWASP Top 10:2025 put Software Supply Chain Failures front-and-center. 🧩⚙️

Now the fun question: by end-2026, do we get public root-cause confirmation that an industrial integrator’s CI/CD/build/signing or update channel led to 2+ critical-infra intrusions? 😬

TA558’s “SteganoAmor” campaign leverages steganography to deliver commodity malware across oil, gas, maritime, and industrial targets. The group’s use of image-embedded payloads and compromised infrastructure...