Dark LLMs: When Your AI Traffic Is C2
Dark LLMs are writing per-host pwsh one-liners, self-rewriting droppers, and hiding in model APIs you approved. If you’re not policing AI egress, you’re not doing detection. 😬🤖
Dark LLMs are writing per-host pwsh one-liners, self-rewriting droppers, and hiding in model APIs you approved. If you’re not policing AI egress, you’re not doing detection. 😬🤖
AI just ran most of an espionage op, and regulators are still in “interesting case study” mode. 😏
We’re forecasting: 55% odds that by 2026, someone will force signed AI connectors + agent logs by default.
Anthropic just showed what happens when your “helpful” AI agents become C2: 80–90% of an espionage op automated, humans just clicking approve.
Lock down identity + connectors or you’re renting your SaaS to someone else’s botnet. 🤖🚨
Your code assistant invents a “helpful” package; an attacker registers it; your pipeline installs it. As of Aug 27, 2025, this is moving from edge case to repeatable tactic. Here’s how to spot it fast and force your builds to fail-closed.
I remember my first security technology spending spree… it crashed the housing market.
If you treated every suspicious domain as a coin flip, in a normally distributed sample, over time you'd have a 50/50 chance at being right.If you filter out the top 1000 domains from Alexa, you're probably at 70/30, if you weed out domains that have more than 3 dots in them, 75/25, 3 or more hyphens might get you to 80/20 and if the domain is greater than 15 chars, it's probably not worth your time....